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War and Peace in Contemporary India 
 
This Special Issue looks at the importance of institutions and the role played by 
international actors in crucial episodes of India’s strategic history. The contributions 
trace India’s tryst with war and peace from immediately before the foundation of the 
contemporary Indian state to the last military conflict between India and Pakistan in 
1999. The focus of the articles is as much on India as it is on Pakistan and China, its 
opponents in war. The articles offer a fresh take on the creation of India as a regional 
military power, and her approach to War and Peace in the post-independence period. 
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On 29 September 2016, the Indian Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) 
announced that the Indian army had ‘conducted surgical strikes’ against terrorist 
‘launch pads’ located ‘along the Line of Control’ (LoC).1  The LoC separates Indian 
and Pakistani administered Kashmir.2 The objective of the strikes, the DGMO made 
clear, was to pre-empt terrorist groups from attacking and infiltrating India.3 In the 
days and weeks that followed, columnists and analysts wrote brazenly of how the 
attacks signalled the coming of age of a new India. Government spokespersons 
underlined that the India of today has left ‘behind the policy paralysis of yesteryears 
                                                        
1 ‘Press statement by DGMO,’ Press Information Bureau, 29 September 2016, available at: 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=151242 
2 Note: In India, Indian-administered Kashmir is known and referred to as the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir. In Pakistan, Pakistani-administered Kashmir is known and referred to as Azad 
(free) Kashmir. For a note, see: Christopher Snedden, Kashmir: The unwritten history (New 
Delhi: HarperCollins 2013), 2. 
3 ‘Press statement by DGMO,’ Press Information Bureau, 29 September 2016, available at: 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=151242. For a brief background on the 
‘surgical strikes’, see: Nitin A. Gokhale, ‘The inside story of India’s 2016 “surgical strikes”’, 
The Diplomat, 23 September 2017, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/the-inside-
story-of-indias-2016-surgical-strikes/ 
and the so-called “strategic restraint”’.4 Commentators and political scientists have 
long argued that India has historically been wary about the use of military force. 
‘Strategic restraint’, they argue has been the crying creed of Indian political leaders, 
dating back to the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first prime minister.5  
The journalistic writing around the surgical strikes and political leaders’ 
portrayal of the same suggests that Indian strategic history can be effortlessly divided 
into two periods: pre and post surgical strikes. In the case of the former, restraint was 
supposedly the predominant norm that informed choices on the use of force. In the 
case of the latter, a post-restraint normative regime is said to be in the making. These 
distinctions, mooted not only by columnists, but also by close observers of strategic 
affairs6, ignore the select revisionist and academic accounts of Indian diplomatic and 
military history. Such works, in fact, make it clear that Indian leaders were hardly 
cagey when it came to the use of force.  
In his magnum opus, War and Peace in Modern India, published in 2010, the 
author, Srinath Raghavan, more than convincingly shows that Nehru could be 
considered a ‘liberal realist’ who was hardly mesmerised by restraint. His approach to 
the use of force was shaped as much by institutional factors as they were by 
diplomatic and political ones depending on the crises under examination. 7  In a 
painstakingly researched analysis of British and American interests in South Asia, 
published in 2013, Paul McGarr clearly shows how India – between the time of Nehru 
                                                        
4 Ram Madhav, ‘A Different Leader’, The Indian Express, 30 September 2016  
5 For a review, note: Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen, ‘Is India Ending its Strategic 
Restraint Doctrine?’ The Washington Quarterly 34/2 (Spring 2011) 163-64. Also see: Sunil 
Dasgupta, ‘The Fate of India’s Strategic Restraint,’ Current History 111/744 (April 2012), 
and Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (New 
Delhi: Oxford University press 2001), 104-7. 
6 See: Nitin A. Gokhale, Securing India the Modi way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes, and More 
(New Delhi: Bloombury 2017), 1, 4.  
7 Srinath Raghavan, War and peace in Modern India: A strategic history of the Nehru years 
(New Delhi: Permanent Black 2010), 12-25. 
and his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri – learnt to calibrate her strategic choices 
during the early Cold War in accordance with the changes in international approaches 
to South Asia.8 The use of force was hardly anathema to leaders like Nehru. These 
works make clear that the pre and post restraint paradigms make very little sense. 
There is a clear gap between the accepted and popular reading of Indian military and 
diplomatic history, and the excellent academic works on the same. In fact, whether or 
not ‘strategic restraint’ is even a useful term in the study of Indian diplomatic and 
military history is debateable.9  
In some ways, this Special Issue seeks to address this gap. Each of the articles 
presented in this Issue looks at the importance of institutions and the role played by 
international actors in crucial episodes of India’s strategic history. In doing so, they 
address how changing international contexts and debates within countries like the 
United States and Britain affected and shaped India’s advance in times of crises. The 
selection of papers trace India’s tryst with war and peace from immediately before the 
foundation of the contemporary Indian state in 1947 to the last military conflict 
between India and Pakistan in 1999. Equally, the focus of the articles is as much on 
India as it is on Pakistan and China, its opponents in war. In sum, this Special Issue 
offers its readers a somewhat more complicated story of India’s strategic past, sourced 
from a wide range of archival sources 
The introduction has been divided into two parts. The first briefly surveys the 
existing works on Indian diplomatic and military history. The second introduces the 
reader to the central arguments made in the selection of papers in this Issue.  
 
                                                        
8 Paul M. McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian 
Subcontinent, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), 2-8.  
9 See: Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Indian “strategic restraint” revisited: The case of the 1965 India-
Pakistan War’, India Review 17/1 (2018), 55-60. 
The Current State of Play  
Diplomatic and military history in and on India is a relatively unexplored subject area. 
In fact, archival-based works on post independent India are rare. It is one of the 
reasons why the prominent historian Ramachandra Guha authored India After Gandhi 
in 2007.10 The fascination with the Colonial era has, to a large extent, drawn history 
departments away from serious works in and on post independent India. As one 
notable author puts it, ‘historians of modern South Asia remain resolutely focused on 
the encounter with the British Empire’. ‘Temporally,’ he continues, ‘they remain 
hesitant to look beyond the moment of decolonisation in 1947’.11  
For the longest time, undergraduate university syllabi in India, such as at 
Delhi University, did not consider the history and politics of India in the post 1947 
period. The story of India as told and read at Oxford and Cambridge rarely included 
works on independent India. In the narrower turf of diplomatic and military history, 
the state of the field is underdeveloped to say the least. Until recently, there was no 
comparison to Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper’s magnificently researched treatise, 
Forgotten Armies, that tells the story of Britain’s Asian Empire during the Second 
World War.12 The first and only serious international history of India in the Second 
World War was published as late as 2016. It shows, as the author argues, not only 
‘what India did for the war’, but also ‘what the war did to India’. It firmly establishes 
that the ‘South Asia of today’, as the author underlines, ‘is in very many ways the 
product of India’s Second World War’.13 The need to better understand India and 
                                                        
10 Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The history of the world’s largest democracy 
(New Delhi: Macmillan 2017).  
11 Srinath Raghavan, The most dangerous place: A history of the United States in South Asia 
(New Delhi: Penguin 2018), xvii.  
12 Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten armies: Britain’s Asian Empire and the war 
with Japan (London: Penguin books 2005).  
13 Srinath Raghavan, India’s War: The making of modern South Asia 1939-1945 (London: 
Allen Lane 2016), 6.  
South Asia in the post-Second World War and post independence period prompted 
universities like King’s College London and Oxford to create contemporary India 
programmes - though only in the last decade or so. The lack of focus on contemporary 
India is even more startling when one considers that the Boden Chair in Sanskrit was 
created at Oxford in 183214.  
Until the 1990s, an argument could be made that the archives in India were 
largely inaccessible, making it hard to write the history of the post independence 
period. Hence, the major works on the diplomatic history of South Asia were authored 
by American and British academics and practitioners-turned-scholars. Excellent as 
they were, the narrative and the arguments they advanced were largely based on a 
very close reading of U.S. State Department papers and British Foreign Office 
records15. On the other hand, a serious examination of Indian decision-making at 
times of war and peace based almost wholly on select access to Nehru’s private 
papers presented only one side of the story, as it were. They were published in the 
1970s and 1980s16. In addition, a wide selection of memoirs and biographies on 
India’s military engagements with both Pakistan and China serve as a fantastic set of 
                                                        
14 For a note on Oxford and Kings’ history with the study of India see their relative websites: 
https://www.ox.ac.uk/about/international-oxford/oxfords-global-links/asia-south-and-
central/india?wssl=1 and https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/kii/aboutus/index.aspx. 
15 See: Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the periphery: The United States, India and 
Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press 1994); Dennis Kux, India and the United 
States: Estranged Democracies 1941-991 (Washington DC: National Defence University 
Press 1992); Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted allies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2001); and Anita Inder Singh, The limits of 
British influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American relationship 1947-56 (London: Printer 
Publishers 1993). For an exceptional study of the 1971 India-Pakistan War based on an 
exhaustive list of interviews, see: Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: 
Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California 
Press1990). For a later work that relies mostly on American declassified sources, see: Howard 
B. Schaffer, The limits of influence: America’s role in Kashmir (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press 2009).  
16 The three-part biography of Nehru by Sarvepalli Gopal is an exceptional example of such 
work. For his analysis of India and Nehru in the post independence period, see: Sarvepalli 
Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Volume two: 1947- 1956 (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press 1979) and Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Volume three: 
1956-1964 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 1984).  
sources, taking the reader straight to the frontlines of diplomatic and military 
decision-making. Yet, and as is often the case with memoirs, they can be self-serving. 
They are, perhaps, best read alongside the many telegrams and reports written by a 
variety of actors present at the time. Further, an excellent selection of official histories 
offers a crucial resource for various Indian military engagements since 1947 17 . 
However, such histories tend to focus more on tactical and operational aspects, and 
say little about the diplomatic and political sides of the conflict at hand. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, archives in India not only opened, but 
also became places of academic frenzy, electrifying scholarly and collaborative works 
by authors from different parts of the world18. A select range of books and articles 
published in the first eighteen years of this century makes this point clear. They are, in 
many respects, the first set of international histories of contemporary India19. Further, 
                                                        
17 See: S.N. Prasad and Dharam Pal, History of operations in Jammu and Kashmir (1947-8) 
(New Delhi: Ministry of Defence 2005); P. B. Sinha and A. A. Athale, History of conflict 
with China 1962 (New Delhi, Ministry of Defence 1992); S. N. Prasad and U. P. Thapliyal, 
The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (New Delhi: Natraj Press 2011); and S. N. Prasad 
and U. P. Thapiyal, The India-Pakistan War of 1971: A History (New Delhi: Natraj 
Publishers 2014).  
18 For a short review see: Suhasini Haider, ‘Troubling Truths,’ Mint, 31 May, 2014, available 
at: https://www.livemint.com/Leisure/9BSsZ9tJCZ6Ge8fuIOse7I/Essay--Troubling-
truths.html. For an excellent example of such collaborative works, see: Amit R. Dasgupta and 
Lorenz M. Luthi (ed.), The Sino-Indian War of 1962 (New Delhi: Routledge 2016).  
19 See: Raghavan, War and Peace; Andrew B. Kennedy, The international ambitions of Mao 
and Nehru: national efficacy beliefs and the making of foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2012); Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A global history of the creation of 
Bangladesh (Boston: Harvard University press); McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia; Rudra 
Chaudhuri, Forged in crisis: India and the United States since 1947 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2014); Raghavan, India’s War; Raghavan, The most dangerous place; Manu 
Bhagavan, The peacemakers: India and the quest for one world (New Delhi: HarperCollins 
2012). Also see: Tanvi Madan, ‘With an eye to the east: The China factor and the US-India 
relationship, 1949-1979’, University of Texas (2012); Yogesh Joshi, ‘Between principles and 
pragmatism: India and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the post-PNE era, 1974-1980’, 
International History Review (2018); Elizabeth Leake, ‘The great game anew: US Cold War 
policy and Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, 1947-65’, International History Review (2013); 
Jayita Sarkar, ‘The making of non-aligned nuclear power: India’s proliferation drift, 1964-
1968’, International History Review 37/5 (2015). For an excellent and recent international 
and economic history see: David C. Engerman, The price of aid: The economic Cold War in 
India (Boston: Harvard University Press 2018). For an excellent account of India’s Wars 
based mostly on secondary sources, see: Arjun Subramaniam, India’s Wars: A military 
scholars have moved past surveying the endless number of ministerial deposits at the 
National Archives in New Delhi to look at alternative, and sometimes richer, sets of 
sources in different and remoter parts of India20. The field of diplomatic and military 
history based on archival material in India and elsewhere is slowly expanding. This 
Special Issue includes a selection of articles to further develop the scope of arguments 
in this arena as a whole. They offer fresh insights based on archival work, as well as a 
closer conceptual reading of Indian, British, and American decision making at times 
of war and peace in contemporary India. In each of their unique ways, they emphasise 
the importance of international concerns and experiences to the manner and method in 
which India dealt with crises from the time immediately before the birth of the 
contemporary Indian state to a little after it acquired nuclear weapons.  
This Issue 
The first article – by Vipul Dutta21 – looks closely at the creation and evolution of the 
Staff College in British India. The college was established in 1907 at Quetta, in 
present-day Pakistan. Works on the institutional history of the Indian military are rare. 
There is no work comparable to Brian Bond’s magnificently detailed account of the 
British Staff College22.  While Stephen Cohen’s book (first published in 2001) on the 
Indian army stands out as a classic in the field, the work is in need of an update23. 
Further, archival documents released in the past two decades beg for a re-write of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
history, 1947-1971 (New Delhi: HarperCollins 2016). For other comprehensive and equally 
excellent accounts, see: Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 
1947 (New Delhi, Oxford University Press 2002) and Dilip Hiro, The Longest August: The 
unflinching rivalry between India and Pakistan (New York: Nation Books 2015).  
20 See: Berenice Guyot-Rechard, Shadow states: India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017).  
21 Vipul Dutta, ‘Indian’ Staff College: Politics and Practices of Military Institution Building 
in Twentieth Century India’. 
22 Brian Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Methuen 
Publishing 1972) 
23 Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: It’s contribution to the development of a nation (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press 2001).  
Indian military’s institutional history. For example, Steven Wilkinson’s more recent 
and meticulous study of civil-military divergence between India and Pakistan is a 
milestone project. He makes a strong case for how ‘political institutionalisation of the 
Congress Party’ and ‘specific coup proofing and balancing measures’ adopted by the 
Indian state deterred and dissuaded military leaders from toppling civilian authority24. 
As important as this work on the Indian army is, it leaves room for a serious 
consideration of the military staff college in the development of the Indian state. In 
his article, Vipul Dutta returns to the moment when ‘India’s Camberley’ – as the Staff 
College in Quetta was referred to – came into being. Dutta examines the processes 
and changes adopted at the Staff College across the two World Wars.  
The analysis offered by Srinath Raghavan does well to compliment Dutta’s 
work on military institutions.25 For Raghavan, the point is quite simple, if one were to 
try and understand India as an Asian power in the contemporary world, it is 
necessary, he argues, to return to the contributions made by her in the Second World 
War. Similarly, as he notes, it is critical to appreciate how the War changed India and 
shaped her advance in the post-independence period. As stated earlier, there is no 
comparable work on India and the Second World War. Whilst Raghavan’s larger 
arguments around the industrialisation of the Indian state are comprehensively made 
in his book26, this article focuses primarily on the expansion of the Indian army and 
the establishment of India’s military industrial base.  
The first two articles – by Vipul Dutta and Srinath Raghavan – are broadly 
about the creation of institutions, and the economic, infrastructural, and military 
transformations that took place in British India because of the Second World War. 
                                                        
24 Steven Wilkinson, Army and nation: The military and Indian democracy since 
independence (Boston: Harvard University Press 2015), 8-9.  
25 Srinath Raghavan, ‘Building the Sinews of Power: India in the Second World War’. 
26 Raghavan, India’s Wars,1-6 
Taken together, they make clear how institution-building and war-fighting 
experiences between 1907 and 1945 helped create a regional military power. The 
following four contributions, on the other hand, focus on how international actors 
dealt with this regional power and her chief foes, China and Pakistan, in a series of 
conflicts between 1962 and 1999. The Issue does not consider the First Kashmir War. 
Works on the 1948-1949 conflict and the international aspects of the same are well 
covered in excellent and relatively recent revisionist accounts27.  
Paul McGarr’s contribution presents the first serious study of Britain’s 
approach to the 1962 Sino-Indian War28. McGarr shows how and why Britain was 
hesitant to be drawn into this conflict. The Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) 
and the Foreign Office (FO) were divided on the question of who was to blame for the 
outbreak of war. The mandarins in the FO, McGarr shows, argued that the war was 
‘forced on the Chinese’. The CRO, on the other hand, sympathised with the Indian 
government. The CRO officials better understood the compulsions of domestic 
politics on Nehru’s democratic government, making accommodation, McGarr 
proposes, harder than is often suggested. Rudra Chaudhuri’s article on the 1965 India-
Pakistan War focuses on the international aspects of the crisis.29 The 1965 War is 
perhaps the least studied conflict in South Asia30. Why it broke out is a question that 
requires further introspection. Chaudhuri argues that the role played by British Prime 
                                                        
27 For a review of the most recent archival based work, see: Rakesh Ankit, The Kashmir 
conflict: From Empire to the Cold War 1945-1966 (London: Routledge 2016); Rakesh Ankit, 
‘Britain and Kashmir, 1948: “The arena of the UN”’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 24/2 (2013), 
273-290.  
28 Paul McGarr, ‘The Long Shadow of Colonial Cartography: Britain and the Sino-Indian 
War of 1962’. Note: For an excellent survey of works on the 1962 war and a revisionist take 
on the same, see: Raghavan, War and Peace, 227-308 
29 Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Just Another Border Conflict:’ The Rann of Kutch and the Indo-
Pakistani War of 1965’. 
30 For a survey see: Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Indian “strategic restraint” revisited.’ From a Pakistani 
perspective, a notable contribution can be found in: Farooq Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent: 
The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 (London: Hurst 2013).  
Minister Harold Wilson is central to understanding why Pakistani President Ayub 
Khan took the decision to risk war with India. In doing so, Chaudhuri offers the first 
international explanation for the outbreak of War, and how such factors shaped Indian 
decision-making in a post-Nehru India.  
Christopher Clary’s contribution on the 1971 India-Pakistan War looks closely 
at the importance of motivated biases, which he shows shaped U.S. Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and U.S. President Richard Nixon’s approach to the crisis 31 . 
Constant comparisons made by these leaders to the civil war in Biafra, Clary 
underlines, made it impossible for them to comprehend the emergency at hand. In his 
meticulously researched article, Clary not only demonstrates how such biases 
misfired, but also how they contributed to the division of Pakistan and the creation of 
the independent state of Bangladesh. John Gill’s article on the 1999 India-Pakistan 
War serves as an essential survey of a conflict fought under the shadow of nuclear 
weapons32. Whilst archival or primary source material is hard to come by in a conflict 
as recent as the one in Kargil, Gill closely considers the risks of conventional 
escalation between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan.  
Taken together, these articles offer a fresh take on the creation of India as a 
regional military power, as well her approach to war and peace in the post-
independence period. Each of the latter four articles – by McGarr, Chaudhuri, Clary, 
                                                        
31 Christopher Clary, ‘Tilting at Windmills: The Flawed U.S. Policy toward the Indo-
Pakistani War of 1971’. 
32 John. H. Gill, ‘Provocation, Conflict and Restraint under the Nuclear Shadow: Kargil and 
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1999’. Note: For a review of existing works, see: Sumit Ganguly 
and Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia 
(New York: Columbia University Press 2010); Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern 
Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
2014), 94-120; Walter Ladwig, ‘Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence 
in South Asia’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38/5 (2015), 729-72 and Evan Braden 
Montgomery and Eric S. Edelman, ‘Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan and 
the Competition for Escalation Dominance’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1-2 (2014), 159-
82.  
and Gill – deal with India’s military engagements since 1947, and emphasise the role 
and importance of international actors and changing international contexts. In sum, 
they offer to further develop and expand the intellectual scope of Indian diplomatic 
and military history.  
The hope is that this Special Issue such prompts deeper interrogations of a 
field that is in dire need of recovery from populist and popular caricaturing. If even a 
small number of students of contemporary Indian history are able to refer to this Issue 
and at least question the simple picture of India as a state apparently wedded to the 
idea of strategic restraint, it would have achieved its objective.  
